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DEGROWTH:  A  DEFENCE
Debating Green Strategy—5
Degrowth, or a ‘green new deal’? Robert Pollin’s contribution to the recent debate on environmental strategy in these pages counterposes the two paths that currently dominate radical discussion of this issue. That they do not exhaust it is clear 
from the other contributors: Herman Daly, the Grand Old Man of eco-
logical economics, reiterates his call for a ‘steady state’ economy in his 
interview with Benjamin Kunkel. Troy Vettese, drawing on the example 
of the seventeenth century’s Little Ice Age, argues for a ‘natural geo-
engineering project’ to lower global temperatures through reforestation, 
and against mooted artificial geo-engineering solutions, which propose to 
manipulate the Earth’s cloud cover, alter the chemical composition of the 
oceans or release a ‘solar shield’ of sunlight-reflecting sulphate particles 
into the upper atmosphere. At the same time, Mike Davis’s discussion 
of the painstaking archival research by Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie into 
the evidence for the Little Ice Age in France illuminates the limits of our 
knowledge of climate history. What follows will focus on Pollin’s trench-
ant criticisms of degrowth and the version of ‘green growth’ he offers 
as an alternative.1
Pollin’s starting point is the urgent need for emissions reduction to 
stabilize global temperatures, as set out by the International Panel on 
Climate Change. Other environmental issues—biodiversity, clean air 
and water, liveable cities—as well as political questions—social and 
international equality, for example—are subordinated to the imperative 
of moderating climate change. ‘There are no certainties about what will 
transpire if we allow the average global temperature to continue rising. 
But as a basis for action, we only need to understand that there is a 
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non-trivial possibility that the continuation of life on Earth as we know 
it is at stake.’2 His programme calls for an extra 1.5–2 per cent of global 
gdp to be invested annually in a fast-growing programme of clean, non-
nuclear, renewable-energy provision, while fossil-fuel industries will be 
shrunk by 35 per cent over the next twenty years, an annual 2.2 per cent. 
Taking aim at proponents of degrowth, he argues:
It is in fact absolutely imperative that some categories of economic activity 
should now grow massively—those associated with the production and dis-
tribution of clean energy. Concurrently, the global fossil-fuel industry needs 
to contract massively—that is, to ‘de-grow’ relentlessly over the next forty or 
fifty years until it has virtually shut down.3
This scenario is based on the ‘absolute decoupling’ of economic growth 
from fossil-fuel consumption—the former can expand while the latter 
contracts. Pollin claims this will drive down CO2 emissions ‘by 40 per 
cent within twenty years, while also supporting rising living standards 
and expanding job opportunities’. He provides costings for the social 
support and retraining of fossil-fuel workers: for the us as a whole this 
amounts to $600 million a year, or 0.2 per cent of the Federal budget. 
There are no costings for compensating the giant oil, gas and coal corpo-
rations; instead, Pollin notes in passing that these behemoths ‘will have 
to be defeated’. Although he concedes the moral case for rich countries 
to reduce their per capita emissions to the level of poorer ones, he con-
siders it politically unrealistic for the us to do so. Under his programme, 
us emissions will fall from 16.5 to 5.8 tons per capita after twenty years, 
but they would still be three times the world average and three times 
higher than China’s per capita emissions, which would fall to 2.3 tons. 
To compensate, Pollin hopes the us will provide poorer countries with 
financial help for the transition.
1 Robert Pollin, ‘De-growth vs a Green New Deal’, nlr 112, July–Aug 2018; Herman 
Daly and Benjamin Kunkel, ‘Ecologies of Scale’, nlr 109, Jan–Feb 2018; Troy 
Vettese, ‘To Freeze the Thames’, nlr 111, May–June 2018; Mike Davis, ‘Taking the 
Temperature of History’, nlr 110, Mar–Apr 2018.
2 Pollin, ‘De-growth vs a Green New Deal’, p. 5.
3 Pollin, ‘De-growth vs a Green New Deal’, pp. 7–8. The ‘degrowth movement’ has 
been organized through the Research & Degrowth network, founded in 2001 by 
Joan Martinez-Alier (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) and Serge Latouche 
(University of Paris-Sud). Since 2008 it has held biennial international confer-
ences in Paris (2008), Barcelona (2010), Montréal/Venice (2012), Leipzig (2014), 
Budapest (2016) and Malmö (2018). For an early analysis from this viewpoint, 
see J. Martinez-Alier, ‘Political Ecology, Distributional Conflicts and Economic 
Incommensurability’, nlr i/211, May–June 1995.
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Taking issue with Kunkel’s opening flourish, that ‘fidelity to gdp growth 
amounts to the religion of the modern world’, Pollin counters that, 
under financialized neoliberalism, the real religion is not growth but 
maximizing profits ‘in order to deliver maximum incomes and wealth 
for the rich’. While agreeing with the degrowth movement that much 
global-capitalist production is wasteful and that gdp is a flawed metric, 
he argues that degrowthers have not produced a viable set of policies to 
cut greenhouse-gas emissions enough to stabilize global temperatures. 
Most damningly, it would seem, Pollin charges that degrowth would cre-
ate soaring levels of poverty and unemployment, while failing to arrest 
climate change. According to his calculations, a 10 per cent contraction 
of the global economy, following a degrowth agenda, would create a 
world-historic slump, with global unemployment rocketing and declin-
ing living standards for poor and working-class people, but would still 
miss ipcc targets.
Limits of decoupling
How well do these claims stand up? Pollin’s argument that the drive for 
profits, not gdp growth, is the real ‘religion’ of financialized neoliberal-
ism fails to acknowledge that both neoliberalism and financialization 
are part of capitalism’s response to the crisis of profitability that arose 
following the breakdown of the post-war settlement between capi-
tal and labour. The underlying problem is not ‘neoliberalism’ but the 
self-expanding system of capitalism, which turns everything into a com-
modity (real or fictitious), and so threatens the basis for the social and 
physical reproduction of human society at a variety of levels. Perhaps it 
is this misidentification of the villain(s)—targeting neoliberalism, not 
the capitalist mode of production—that helps Pollin to propose what is 
essentially a social-democratic approach of mitigated capitalism. At the 
same time, there is no doubt that the imaginary of gdp growth remains 
a powerful ideological force in its own right, mystifying the real eco-
nomic processes at stake and instead focusing debate on the idea of 
expansion as an inherent good. It has a significant influence on deci-
sions regarding production, distribution and consumption, and on the 
financial system that facilitates each of these elements.
Pollin is partially right to argue that the degrowth movement has not 
prioritized the formulation of detailed policy proposals on reducing 
greenhouse-gas emissions; its contributions have generally concentrated 
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on showing how gdp growth makes such reduction harder. However, 
there are degrowthers who have addressed this question. Kevin 
Anderson, certainly an ally of degrowth, has proposed a Marshall Plan 
to decarbonize energy supplies, as well as shifts in ‘behaviour and prac-
tices’ such as frequent flying.4 Energy and resource caps feature in the 
work of ecological economist Blake Alcott, for example, and the ‘cap 
and share’ variant of this approach has been taken up by Brian Davey 
and the Irish ngo, feasta.5 Again, Pollin is right to call for a specific 
sectoral analysis of what needs to happen to make the ‘dirty’ sectors 
contract and the clean sectors—the ‘replacement economy’—expand. 
Proponents of degrowth have never argued that some sectors should not 
grow, and shutting down fossil-fuel industries has been a strong strand 
in their work; it was, for example, the main extra-academic project of the 
Leipzig degrowth conference in 2014. Crucially, however, this sectoral 
adjustment needs to take place within an overall envelope that contracts, 
so that aggregate human activity remains within safe planetary limits 
and its ecological footprint does not exceed the available biocapacity. 
This is not just a matter of carbon; it involves water, air, forests, crop-
lands and fishing grounds, as affected by the processes of production, 
consumption and trade. 
Pollin’s argument is posited on the ‘absolute decoupling’ of economic 
activity from fossil fuels. He rightly emphasizes that the more modest 
goal of ‘relative decoupling’—‘through which fossil-fuel consumption 
and CO2 emissions continue to increase, but at a slower rate than gdp 
growth’—is not a solution. He goes on to argue that it’s fine for econo-
mies to continue growing as rapidly as China and India have been doing, 
so long as the growth process is completely delinked from fossil fuels. 
However, Pollin doesn’t confront the difficulties involved in ensuring 
that this absolute decoupling will occur. It’s implausible that Chinese and 
Indian growth rates could have been so high without soaring fossil-fuel 
4 See for example Kevin Anderson, ‘Manchester, Paris and 20C: Laggard or Leader’, 
presentation available on the Greater Manchester Combined Authority website. 
In the assessment of Anderson and his co-author Alice Bows, ‘only the global 
economic slump has had any significant impact in reversing the trend of rising 
emissions’: ‘Beyond “Dangerous” Climate Change: Emission Scenarios for a New 
World’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, vol. 369, no. 1934, 2011.
5 Blake Alcott, ‘Impact Caps: Why Population, Affluence and Technology Strategies 
Should Be Abandoned’, Journal of Cleaner Production, vol. 18, no. 6, 2010; Brian 
Davey, ed., Sharing for Survival, Dublin 2012.
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consumption—not to mention the carbon emissions caused by changed 
land-use and the production of concrete and steel. Pollin appeals to a 
World Resources Institute study which claimed to show that in a num-
ber of advanced economies, including the us, Germany and the uk, gdp 
growth had indeed been decoupled from CO2 emissions for the period 
2000–14.6 On closer inspection, however, there are serious problems of 
data quality in the wri paper, including the use of different reporting 
protocols by different countries, missing data—emissions from inter-
national shipping and aviation are not counted in the national totals, 
for example—and the ‘construct validity’ of proxy measures: whether 
they actually measure what they purport to. The observed effects may 
reflect one-off or reversible changes—such as the impact of the 2008 
economic crisis.7 
In addition, these supposedly ‘decoupling’ countries have also been 
de-industrializing, switching to financialized-capitalist economies with 
large service sectors, and importing commodities manufactured else-
where. This creates further problems on both sides of the ‘economic 
growth/carbon emissions’ equation. First, through outsourcing produc-
tion, firms headquartered in the rich countries obtain goods produced 
at poor-country wage costs, but sold at rich-country consumer-market 
prices, the sales then figuring in the rich country’s gdp.8 In other 
words, part of the gdp growth attributed to the supposedly ‘decoupling’ 
advanced economies is the result of labour processes in poorer countries. 
The gdp of rich countries is inflated through this neo-colonial value 
capture, but the emissions are counted in the emerging economies in 
which the commodities were produced. This would appear to qualify, if 
not invalidate, the decoupling claim. The problem is compounded by the 
fact that the gdp figures enter into both sides of the comparison, since 
as well as being one of the two variables considered, gdp is used to com-
pute consumption-based emissions which are not directly measured. In 
any event, the rate of emissions reduction in the apparently decoupling 
countries would be nowhere near sufficient to avert climate catastrophe. 
6 Nate Aden, ‘The Roads to Decoupling: 21 Countries Are Reducing Carbon 
Emissions While Growing gdp’, World Resources Institute blog, 5 April 2016.
7 For a more detailed critique, see Mark Burton, ‘New Evidence on Decoupling 
Carbon Emissions from gdp Growth: What Does It Mean?’, Steady State 
Manchester blog, 15 April 2016.
8 This is not the only mechanism by which the core countries’ income is inflated; 
transfer pricing by multinationals is another.
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As Anderson and Bows have shown, the developed economies—known 
as ‘Annex 1’ parties in the Kyoto Accord—need to be cutting emissions 
at 8 to 10 per cent a year, whereas in the ‘decoupling’ countries emis-
sions were falling at a mere 2 per cent.9 Meanwhile, global emissions 
for the period 2000–14 actually increased by 45 per cent, with the world 
economy as a whole showing no signs of decoupling. Pollin therefore 
risks underestimating the rate of emissions reduction required to avoid 
catastrophic climate change. 
Moreover, when the full picture of material flows through national econ-
omies is considered—the ‘physical throughput’ emphasized by Herman 
Daly—it turns out that there is no decoupling at all between resource 
use and gdp growth.10 While Pollin is right to emphasize carbon emis-
sions, it’s also clear that present levels of production-consumption (let 
alone their growth) require materials which are, to varying extents, 
becoming scarcer.11 The cost of obtaining them has risen, putting a grow-
ing strain on the global economy—the dynamic that underpinned the 
Limits to Growth business-as-usual scenario, with its system crash in the 
mid twenty-first century. Their extraction entails the destruction of liveli-
hoods and ecosystems across the world, and particularly in the global 
South. All this would seem to put degrowth firmly back on the agenda, 
since to achieve a radical reduction in emissions we need a global econ-
omy that is considerably smaller in material terms.12 
The scale of the world economy exceeds the Earth’s biological and physi-
cal capacity to absorb the impacts and restore the resources used. The 
Global Footprint Network currently estimates humankind’s collective 
material footprint at 1.7 times the available biocapacity. Daly is correct 
to argue that population size is an important part of environmental 
9 Anderson and Bows, ‘Beyond “Dangerous” Climate Change’.
10 Thomas Wiedmann, Heinz Schandl et al., ‘The Material Footprint of Nations’, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 112, no. 20, May 2015. See Daly 
and Kunkel, ‘Ecologies of Scale’, p. 89.
11 Carlos de Castro, Margarita Mediavilla et al., ‘Global Wind Power Potential: 
Physical and Technological Limits’, Energy Policy, vol. 39, no. 10, October 2011; 
‘Global Solar Electric Potential: A Review of Their Technical and Sustainable 
Limits’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 28, December 2013.
12 Post-extractivism—the movement against extractivism in the global South—has 
been closely allied with degrowth. See Alberto Acosta, ‘Post-Growth and Post-
Extractivism: Two Sides of the Same Cultural Transformation’, Alternautas, March 
2016; Alberto Acosta and Ulrich Brand, Salidas del laberinto capitalista: Decrecimiento 
y postextractivismo, Barcelona 2017.
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impact.13 However, while global emissions are still rising, the rate of 
population growth has slowed significantly—increasing from 4 billion 
to 7 billion between 1975 and 2010, but only projected to reach 8 billion 
by the mid-2020s and around 9 billion by 2050.14 The main driver of 
the slow-down is the declining rate of fertility, already below replace-
ment level in Europe, though higher in India and sub-Saharan Africa. 
Historically, rising living standards, urbanization and education, par-
ticularly for women, have been associated with falling fertility, while 
poorer and more unequal countries tend to have higher rates. If these 
conditions were tackled, and primary health care as well as modern con-
traception made freely available, the global population could stabilize 
and even begin to decline before 2050.
Green expansion?
What of Pollin’s proposal to stabilize the climate by investing an annual 
2 per cent of global gdp in clean energy? His argument is that this 
switch to renewables can cut global emissions by 40 per cent within 
twenty years ‘while also supporting rising living standards and expand-
ing job opportunities’. So far, however, the expansion of renewables has 
come as an addition to fossil-fuel supplies, rather than as a replacement 
for them (see Table 1, overleaf). The countries that are most advanced in 
developing renewable energy, such as Denmark and Germany, have also 
expanded their consumption of fossil fuels, particularly coal; the same 
applies to the us, China, India, Canada and Australia. To replace oil, 
coal and gas with other sources of energy would take something like an 
18-fold increase in renewables deployment, at current levels of energy 
consumption. If worldwide energy usage were to increase, as Pollin indi-
cates, then the challenge would be even greater. 
The contradiction of the ‘green new deal’ is that gdp growth makes 
reducing emissions far harder. Expanding the economy inevitably 
13 ‘Environmental impact is the product of the number of people times per capita 
resource use’: ‘Ecologies of Scale’, p. 93.
14 Projections beyond 2050 involve a high degree of uncertainty. In a 2014 paper 
Patrick Gerland and his colleagues estimate a global population between 9.6 and 
12.3 billion in 2100. See Gerland et al., ‘World Population Stabilization Unlikely 
this Century’, Science, vol. 346, no. 6206, 10 October 2014; see also K. C. Samir 
and Wolfgang Lutz, ‘The Human Core of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways: 
Population Scenarios by Age, Sex and Level of Education for All Countries to 2100’, 
Global Environmental Change, vol. 42, January 2017, pp. 181–92.
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means more extraction, production, distribution and consumption, 
and each of these processes produces emissions. If Pollin’s renewable-
energy investment plan also succeeded in generating tens of millions 
of new jobs and raising living standards worldwide, as he hopes, that 
would mean a further increase in the consumption of carbon-intensive 
services and products—unless the relevant industries were thoroughly 
decarbonized, probably in conjunction with caps on energy use, extrac-
tion and land-use conversion.
In theory, contracting the world economy need not hurt the relatively 
poor, since high emissions are strongly correlated with concentrations 
of wealth and income: globally, the top 10 per cent of emitters contribute 
approximately 45 per cent of greenhouse-gas emissions, while the bottom 
50 per cent contribute only 13 per cent.15 Deep economic retrenchment 
can be managed equitably, as was demonstrated during the hardship of 
the Special Period in Cuba in the early 90s, when punitive us sanctions 
exacerbated the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The possibil-
ity that contraction might take place in a properly democratic fashion was 
explored by André Gorz—acclaimed as a forerunner by the degrowth 
movement—who called for forms of workers’ self-management as a 
Table 1: Primary Energy Consumption by Fuel, Million Tonne Equivalents
Source: BP Energy Outlook, 2018.
15 Lucas Chancel and Thomas Piketty, ‘Carbon and Inequality from Kyoto to Paris: 
Trends in the Global Inequality of Carbon Emissions (1998–2013) and Prospects for 
an Equitable Adaptation Fund’, Paris School of Economics, November 2015, p. 50.
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Oil 2,253 2,986 3,153 3,580 4,021 4,564
Gas 890 1,291 1,767 2,182 2,874 3,534
Coal 1,483 1,813 2,246 2,385 3,636 3,697
Nuclear 18 161 453 584 626 674
Hydro 266 385 487 601 779 1,015
Renewables 2 7 35 59 234 794
Total 4,912 6,642 8,142 9,390 12,170 14,278
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means to ‘restore the correlation between less work and less consump-
tion, on one hand, and more autonomy and more existential security on 
the other’.16 Pollin’s proposals for a ‘just transition’ to renewable energy 
that would also contribute to greater global equity are welcome; but so 
far work in this area, including Pollin’s, has tended to concentrate on the 
fossil-fuel industry.17
Finally, Pollin argues that a degrowth agenda to shrink global gdp by 
10 per cent over the next twenty years would entail a slump four times 
deeper than the 2008 recession, with world unemployment soaring amid 
steep spending cuts, yet the net effect would be to push CO2 emissions 
down by a mere 10 per cent—from 32 to 29 billion tons—nowhere near 
the necessary fall to 20 billion tons by 2040. This is correct. On its own, 
managed economic contraction—which isn’t the same as degrowth, 
but is a component of it—will not bring about the kind of emissions 
cuts we need. But as we have seen, maintaining aggregate expansion of 
the economy, tracked by gdp growth, will add to the hill that has to be 
climbed. Besides, even the elimination of fossil fuels may not be enough 
to ensure the future of life on Earth, given the increasing pressures on 
ecosystems and scarce resources. Capitalism’s relentless quest for new 
forms of profit-making, and for natural resources to exploit and extract, 
is not limited to oil, coal and gas.
Even if this is not on the cards in the immediate future, an ecologically 
sustainable world economy would have to be delinked from the drive for 
profits, and ordered instead around the principle of deploying human 
capabilities to meet human needs, within the limits of Earth’s biocapac-
ity. In other words, it would be a socialist mode of production of some 
sort. This would need to involve the equitable control and reduction of the 
material scale of the global economy, together with targeted curtailment 
of emissions.18 That means drastic action to cut industrial production (of 
goods that are not needed, that involve high energy consumption, that 
16 André Gorz, ‘Political Ecology: Expertocracy versus Self-Limitation’, nlr i/202, 
Nov–Dec 1993; see also Ecology as Politics, London 1987.
17 See the examples of local outcomes for energy workers in Europe, China, 
Australia, Argentina and the us cited in Anabella Rosenberg, ‘Strengthening Just 
Transition Policies in International Climate Governance’, Stanley Foundation, 
Muscatine, ia 2017.
18 Decreasing the scale of the global material economy is proposed here as a means 
to an end, emissions reduction—a necessary condition for strong sustainabil-
ity. Arguably, this voluntary downscaling, one dimension of degrowth, may be a 
desirable end in itself.
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do not last) as well as industrial construction (roads, airports, specula-
tive skyscrapers and shopping malls), industrial agriculture (fossil-fuel 
dependent monocultures that destroy soils and water supplies, and 
require huge energy inputs to bring food to the table) and industrial dis-
tribution (sea, air and road transportation systems, all highly dependent 
on fossil-fuel combustion). The working week would be much shorter, 
and consumption in the developed world, and by elites in the develop-
ing world, severely circumscribed. Heating would be provided entirely 
by electricity generated from renewable sources. Transport would largely 
be public, powered by electricity or hydrogen fuel cells. Construction 
would no longer involve the use of cement or steel. Agriculture would be 
guided by the principles of agroecology: biodiversity and complexity as 
the foundation for soil quality, plant health and crop productivity; diversi-
fied farming practices, including crop rotation, polycultures, agroforestry, 
green manures, crop-livestock mixtures, cover crops and mulching.19
None of this suggests that it would be easy to steer the world economy 
towards its ecologically consistent size. Indeed, it perhaps hardly seems 
likely that this will happen. Yet that does not mean there is any escape 
from the fundamental problem that the global economy now far exceeds 
the capacity of Earth’s systems to sustain its demands; expanding it fur-
ther can only make matters worse. The mitigated capitalism of a ‘green 
new deal’ will be little help, because it leaves the overall system of com-
modification, and the motors of expansion, firmly in place. How degrowth 
might happen we don’t know. A fortuitous combination of popular strug-
gle and collapse of the capitalist system is perhaps the only route. That 
isn’t to say that good governmental action, including investment in clean 
energy and demand-reduction measures, can’t help. But for it to work, 
government policy would have to break from its normal mode of hand-
maiden to global capital. Unrealistic? Implausible? Probably, but no more 
than Pollin’s imaginary of green accumulation to the rescue.
19 Third World Network, Agroecology: Key Concepts, Principles and Practices, Penang 
and Berkeley 2015.
